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INTRODUCTION
A little over a decade ago, a biologist asked
the question “Can a biologist fix a radio?”
(Lazebnik, 2002). That question framed
an amusing yet profound discussion of
which methods are most appropriate to
understand the inner workings of a sys-
tem, such as a radio. For the engineer, the
answer is straightforward: you trace out
the transistors, resistors, capacitors etc.,
and then draw an electrical circuit dia-
gram. At that point you have understood
how the radio works and have sufficient
information to reproduce its function. For
the biologist, as Lazebnik suggests, the
answer is more complicated. You first get
a hundred radios, snip out one transis-
tor in each, and observe what happens.
Perhaps the radio will make a peculiar
buzzing noise that is statistically signifi-
cant across the population of radios, which
indicates that the transistor is necessary
to make the sound normal. Or perhaps
we should snip out a resistor, and then
homogenize it to find out the relative
composition of silicon, carbon, etc. We
might find that certain compositions cor-
relate with louder volumes, for example,
or that if we modify the composition, the
radio volume decreases. In the end, we
might draw a kind of neat box-and-arrow
diagram, in which the antenna feeds to
the circuit board, and the circuit board
feeds to the speaker, and the microphone
feeds to the recording circuit, and so on,
based on these empirical studies. The only
problem is that this does not actually
show how the radio works, at least not
in any way that would allow us to repro-
duce the function of the radio given the
diagram. As Lazebnik argues, even though
we could multiply experiments to add
pieces of the diagram, we still won’t really
understand how the radio works. To para-
phrase Feynmann, if we cannot recreate
it, then perhaps we have not understood
it (Hawking, 2001; Eliasmith and Trujillo,
2014).
Lazebnik’s argument should not be
construed to disparage biological research
in general. There are abundant examples
of howmolecular biology has led to break-
throughs, including many if not all of the
pharmaceuticals currently on the market.
Likewise, research in psychology has pro-
vided countless insights that have led to
useful interventions, for instance in cogni-
tive behavioral therapy (Rothbaum et al.,
2000). These are valuable ends in and of
themselves. Still, are we missing greater
breakthroughs by not asking the right
questions that would illuminate the larger
picture?
Within the fields of systems, cognitive,
and behavioral neuroscience in particular,
I fear we are in danger of losing the mean-
ing of the Question “how does it work?”
As the saying goes, if you have a ham-
mer, everything starts to look like a nail.
Having been trained in engineering as well
as neuroscience and psychology, I find all
of the methods of these disciplines useful.
Still, many researchers are especially well-
trained in psychology, and so the research
questions focus predominantly on under-
standing which brain regions carry out
which psychological or cognitive func-
tions, following the established paradigms
of psychological research. This has resulted
in the question being often reframed as
“what brain regions are active during
what psychological processes,” or the more
sophisticated “what networks are active,”
instead of “whatmechanisms are necessary
to reproduce the essential cognitive func-
tions and activity patterns in the system.”
To illustrate the significance of this differ-
ence, consider a computer (Figure 1). How
does it work?
THE TALE
Once upon a time, a group of neu-
roscientists happened upon a computer
(Carandini, 2012). Not knowing how it
worked, they each decided to find out how
it sensed a variety of inputs and generated
the sophisticated output seen on its dis-
play. The EEG researcher quickly went to
work, putting an EEG cap on the moth-
erboard and measuring voltages at vari-
ous points all over it, including on the
outer case for a reference point. She found
that when the hard disk was accessed, the
disk controller showed higher voltages on
average, and especially more power in the
higher frequency bands. When there was
a lot of computation, a lot of activity
was seen around the CPU. Furthermore,
the CPU showed increased activity in
a way that is time-locked to computa-
tional demands. “See here,” the researcher
declared, “we now have a fairly temporally
precise picture of which regions are active,
and with what frequency spectra.” But has
she really understood how the computer
works?
Next, the enterprising physicist and
cognitive neuroscientist came along. “We
don’t have enough spatial resolution to
see inside the computer,” they said. So
they developed a new imaging technique
by which activity can be measured, called
the Metabolic Radiation Imaging (MRI)
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FIGURE 1 | The inside of a typical computer, showing CPU, hard disk, memory, and disk controller.
camera, which now measures the heat
(infrared) given off by each part of the
computer in the course of its operations.
At first, they found simply that lots of
math operations lead to heat given off by
certain parts of the CPU, and that mem-
ory storage involved the RAM, and that
file operations engaged the hard disk. A
flurry of papers followed, showing that
the CPU and other areas are activated by
a variety of applications such as word-
processing, speech recognition, game play,
display updating, storing new memories,
retrieving from memory, etc.
Eventually, the MRI researchers gained
a crucial insight, namely that none of these
components can be understood prop-
erly in isolation; they must understand
the network. Now the field shifts, and
they begin to look at interactions among
regions. Before long, a series of high
profile papers emerge showing that file
access does not just involve the disks. It
involves a network of regions including
the CPU, the RAM, the disk controller,
and the disk. They know this because
when they experimentally increase the file
access, all of these regions show corre-
lated increases in activity. Next, they find
that the CPU is a kind of hub region,
because its activity at various times cor-
relates with activity in other regions, such
as the display adapter, the disk controller,
the RAM, and the USB ports, depending
on what task they require the computer to
perform.
Next, one of the MRI researchers has
the further insight to study the computer
while it is idle. He finds that there is a net-
work involving the CPU, the memory, and
the hard disk, as (unbeknownst to them)
the idle computer occasionally swaps vir-
tual memory on and off of the disk and
monitors its internal temperature. This
resting network is slightly different across
different computers in a way that corre-
lates with their processor speed, memory
capacity, etc., and thus it is possible to pre-
dict various capacities and properties of a
given computer by measuring its activity
pattern when idle. Another flurry of publi-
cations results. In this way, the neuroscien-
tists continue to refine their understanding
of the network interactions among parts of
the computer. They can in fact use these
developments to diagnose computer prob-
lems. After studying 25 normal computers
and comparing them against 25 comput-
ers with broken disk controllers, they find
that the connectivity between the CPU
and the disk controller is reduced in those
with broken disk controllers. This allows
them to use MRI to diagnose other com-
puters with broken disk controllers. They
conclude that the disk controller plays a
key role in mediating disk access, and
this is confirmed with a statistical media-
tion analysis. Someone even develops the
technique of Directional Trunk Imaging
(DTI) to characterize the structure of the
ribbon cables (fiber tract) from the disk
controller to the hard disk, and the results
match the functional correlations between
the hard disk and disk controller. But for
all this, have they really understood how
the computer works?
The neurophysiologist spoke up.
“Listen here,” he said. “You have found the
larger patterns, but you don’t know what
the individual circuits are doing.” He then
probes individual circuit points within the
computer, measuring the time course of
the voltage. After meticulously advancing
a very fine electrode in 10 micron incre-
ments through the hard material (dura
mater) covering the CPU, he finds a volt-
age. The particular region shows brief
“bursts” of positive voltage when the CPU
is carrying out math operations. As this is
the math co-processor unit (unbeknownst
to the neurophysiologist), the particular
circuit path is only active when a cer-
tain bit of a floating point representation
is active. With careful observation, the
neurophysiologist identifies this “cell” as
responding stochastically when certain
numbers are presented for computa-
tion. The cell therefore has a relatively
broad but weak receptive field for certain
numbers. Similar investigations of nearby
regions of the CPU yield similar results,
while antidromic stimulation reveals
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inputs from related number-representing
regions. In the end, the neurophysiologist
concludes that the cells in this particu-
lar CPU region have receptive fields that
respond to different kinds of numbers, so
this must be a number representation area.
Finally the neuropsychologist comes
along. She argues (quite reasonably) that
despite all of these findings of network
interactions and voltage signals, we cannot
infer that a given region is necessary with-
out lesion studies. The neuropsychologist
then gathers a hundred computers that
have had hammer blows to various parts
of the motherboard, extension cards, and
disks. After testing their abilities exten-
sively, she carefully selects just the few that
have a specific problemwith the video out-
put. She finds that among computers that
don’t display video properly, there is an
overlapping area of damage to the video
card. This means of course that the video
card is necessary for proper video mon-
itor functioning. Other similar discover-
ies follow regarding the hard disks and
the USB ports, and now we have a map
of which regions are necessary for vari-
ous functions. But for all of this, have the
neuroscientists really understood how the
computer works?
THE MORAL OF THE STORY
As the above tale illustrates, despite all
of our current sophisticated methods, we
in neuroscience are still in a kind of
early stage of scientific endeavor; we con-
tinue to discover many effects but lack
a proportionally strong standard model
for understanding how they all derive
from mechanistic principles. There are
nonetheless many individual mathemati-
cal and computational neural models. The
Hodgkin–Huxley equations (Hodgkin and
Huxley, 1952), Integrate-and-fire model
(Izhikevich, 2003), Genesis (Bower and
Beeman, 1994), SPAUN (Eliasmith et al.,
2012), and Blue Brain project (Markram,
2006) are only a few examples of the
models, modeling toolkits, and frame-
works available, besides many others more
focused on particular phenomena. Still,
there are many different kinds of neu-
roscience models, and even many differ-
ent frameworks for modeling. This means
that there is no one theoretical lingua
franca against which to evaluate empir-
ical results, or to generate new predic-
tions. Instead, there is a patchwork of
models that treat some phenomena, and
large gaps where there are no models rel-
evant to existing phenomena. The moral
of the story is not that the brain is a com-
puter. The moral of the story is twofold:
first, that we sorely need a foundational
mechanistic, computational framework to
understand how the elements of the brain
work together to form functional units
and ultimately generate the complex cog-
nitive behaviors we study. Second, it is
not enough for models to exist—their
premises and implications must be under-
stood by those on the front lines of
empirical research.
THE PATH FORWARD
A more unified model shared by the com-
munity is not out of reach for neuro-
science. Such exists in physics (e.g., the
standard model), engineering (e.g., cir-
cuit theory), and chemistry. To move for-
ward, we need to consider placing a similar
level of value on theoretical neuroscience
as for example the field of physics places
on theoretical physics. We need to train
neuroscientists and psychologists early in
their careers in not just statistics, but also
in mathematical and computational mod-
eling, as well as dynamical systems the-
ory and even engineering. Computational
theories exist (Marr, 1982), and empir-
ical neuroscience is advancing, but we
need to develop the relationships between
them. This is not to say that all neuro-
scientists should spend their time build-
ing computational models. Rather, every
neuroscientist should at least possess lit-
eracy in modeling as no less important
than, for example, anatomy. Our gradu-
ate programs generally need improvement
on this front. For faculty, if one is in a
soft money position or on the tenure clock
and cannot afford the time to learn or
develop theories, then why not collaborate
with someone who can? If we really care
about the question of how the brain works,
we must not delude ourselves into think-
ing that simply collecting more empiri-
cal results will automatically tell us how
the brain works any more than measuring
the heat coming from computer parts will
tell us how the computer works. Instead,
our experiments should address the ques-
tions of what mechanisms might account
for an effect, and how to test and fal-
sify specific mechanistic hypotheses (Platt,
1964).
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